Art and Interpretation

picture of man looking at art objectsInterpretation in art refers to the attribution of meaning to a work. A point on which people oftentimes disagree is whether the artist's or author's intention is relevant to the interpretation of the work. In the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of art, views near interpretation branch into two major camps: intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, with an initial focus on one fine art, namely literature.

The anti-intentionalist maintains that a work'due south pregnant is entirely determined by linguistic and literary conventions, thereby rejecting the relevance of the author'southward intention. The underlying assumption of this position is that a work enjoys autonomy with respect to pregnant and other aesthetically relevant properties. Actress-textual factors, such every bit the author's intention, are neither necessary nor sufficient for pregnant conclusion. This early position in the analytic tradition is oft called conventionalism because of its potent emphasis on convention. Anti-intentionalism gradually went out of favor at the end of the 20th century, merely it has seen a revival in the then-called value-maximizing theory, which recommends that the interpreter seek value-maximizing interpretations constrained by convention and, co-ordinate to a different version of the theory, by the relevant contextual factors at the time of the work's production.

Past contrast, the initial brand of intentionalism—actual intentionalism—holds that interpreters should concern themselves with the writer's intention, for a work'southward meaning is affected by such intention. There are at to the lowest degree three versions of actual intentionalism. The accented version identifies a piece of work's significant fully with the author'southward intention, therefore assuasive that an author can intend her piece of work to mean any she wants it to mean. The farthermost version acknowledges that the possible meanings a work can sustain have to exist constrained by convention. Co-ordinate to this version, the author's intention picks the correct meaning of the work as long equally information technology fits ane of the possible meanings; otherwise, the work ends up existence meaningless. The moderate version claims that when the author's intention does not match any of the possible meanings, meaning is fixed instead by convention and perhaps likewise context.

A second make of intentionalism, which finds a middle course between actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, is hypothetical intentionalism. Co-ordinate to this position, a work'south meaning is the advisable audition's best hypothesis nigh the author's intention based on publicly bachelor data about the author and her work at the time of the slice'due south product. A variation on this position attributes the intention to a hypothetical author who is postulated by the interpreter and who is constituted by work features. Such authors are sometimes said to exist fictional because they, being purely conceptual, differ decisively from mankind-and-blood authors.

This article elaborates on these theories of interpretation and considers their notable objections. The debate almost interpretation covers other art forms in add-on to literature. The theories of interpretation are also extended across many of the arts. This wide outlook is assumed throughout the article, although nothing said is affected fifty-fifty if a narrow focus on literature is adopted.

Table of Contents

  1. Key Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Estimation
  2. Anti-Intentionalism
    1. The Intentional Fallacy
    2. Beardsley'due south Speech Act Theory of Literature
    3. Notable Objections and Replies
  3. Value-Maximizing Theory
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  4. Actual Intentionalism
    1. Accented Version
    2. Extreme Version
    3. Moderate Version
    4. Objections to Actual Intentionalism
  5. Hypothetical Intentionalism
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  7. Conclusion
  8. References and Further Reading

1. Fundamental Concepts: Intention, Pregnant, and Interpretation

It is common for us to ask questions near works of art due to puzzlement or curiosity. Sometimes we do not understand the point of the work. What is the point of, for example, Metamorphosis by Kafka or Duchamp's Fountain? Sometimes in that location is ambivalence in a work and we want it resolved. For example, is the final sequence of Christopher Nolan'south film Inception reality or another dream? Or exercise ghosts actually exist in Henry James'southward The Turn of the Screw? Sometimes nosotros make hypotheses well-nigh details in a work. For case, does the woman in white in Raphael's The Schoolhouse of Athens represent Hypatia? Is the conch in William Golding's Lord of the Flies a symbol for civilization and commonwealth?

What these questions have in mutual is that all of them seek afterwards things that get beyond what the work literally presents or says. They are all concerned with the implicit contents of the piece of work or, for simplicity, with the meanings of a work. A distinction can be drawn between ii kinds of significant in terms of telescopic. Pregnant can be global in the sense that information technology concerns the work'due south theme, thesis, or point. For example, an audience first encountering Duchamp's Fountain would desire to know Duchamp's signal in producing this readymade or, put otherwise, what the work as a whole is made to convey. The aforementioned goes for Kafka'south Metamorphosis, which contains and so bizarre a plot as to brand the reader wonder what the story is all about. Meaning tin also be local insofar as information technology is virtually what a part of a piece of work conveys. Inquiries into the pregnant of a particular sequence in Christopher Nolan's film, the woman in Raphael's fresco, or the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies are directed at only part of the work.

We are said to exist interpreting when trying to find out answers to questions about the pregnant of a work. In other words, interpretation is the try to attribute piece of work-meaning. Here "attribute" can hateful "recover," which is retrieving something already existing in a piece of work; or it can more than weakly mean "impose," which entails ascribing a significant to a work without ontologically creating anything. Many of the major positions in the debate endorse either the impositional view or the retrieval view.

When an interpretative question arises, a frequent way to deal with it is to resort to the creator's intention. We may ask the creative person to reveal her intention if such an opportunity is available; we may also check what she says near her work in an interview or autobiography. If we have access to her personal documents such as diaries or letters, they too will become our interpretative resources. These are all prove of the creative person's intention. When the evidence is compelling, we accept good reason to believe it reveals the artist's intention.

Certainly, there are cases in which external show of the artist's intention is absent, including when the work is anonymous. This poses no difficulty for philosophers who view appeal to artistic intention every bit crucial, for they accept that internal bear witness—the work itself—is the all-time evidence of the artist'south intention. Most of the time, close attention to details of the work will lead us to what the artist intended the work to mean.

Just what is intention exactly? Intention is a kind of mental country unremarkably characterized as a design or plan in the artist'due south mind to be realized in her artistic creation. This crude view of intention is sometimes refined into the reductive analysis 1 will find in a contemporaneous textbook of philosophy of mind: intention is constituted by belief and desire. Some actual intentionalists explain the nature of intention from a Wittgensteinian perspective: authorial intention is viewed as the purposive structure of the piece of work that can be discerned by close inspection. This view challenges the assumption that intentions are always private and logically independent of the work they cause, which is often interpreted as a position held past anti-intentionalists.

A 2005 proposal holds that intentions are executive attitudes toward plans (Livingston). These attitudes are house but defeasible commitments to acting on them. Contra the reductive analysis of intention, this view holds that intentions are distinct and existent mental states that serve a range of functions irreducible to other mental states.

Clarifying each of these basic terms (meaning, interpretation, and intention) requires an essay-length treatment that cannot be washed here. For current purposes, it suffices to introduce the aforesaid views and proposals normally assumed. Behave in mind that for the almost part the debate over art interpretation proceeds without consensus on how to define these terms, and clarifications appear simply when necessary.

2. Anti-Intentionalism

Anti-intentionalism is considered the first theory of interpretation to emerge in the analytic tradition. It is normally seen equally affiliated with the New Criticism motility that was prevalent in the eye of the twentieth century. The position was initially a reaction confronting biographical criticism, the chief idea of which is that the interpreter, to grasp the significant of a work, needs to report the life of the author considering the work is seen every bit reflecting the author'south mental earth. This approach led to people considering the author'south biographical data rather than her work. Literary criticism became criticism of biography, non criticism of literary works. Against this trend, literary critic William K. Wimsatt and philosopher Monroe C. Beardsley coauthored a seminal newspaper "The Intentional Fallacy" in 1946, marking the starting point of the intention contend. Beardsley subsequently extended his anti-intentionalist opinion across the arts in his monumental book Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism ([1958] 1981a).

a. The Intentional Fallacy

The main thought of the intentional fallacy is that entreatment to the creative person'southward intention outside the piece of work is fallacious, because the work itself is the verdict of what meaning it bears. This contention is based on the anti-intentionalist's ontological assumption about works of art.

This underlying supposition is that a work of fine art enjoys autonomy with respect to pregnant and other aesthetically relevant properties. Every bit Beardsley'south Principle of Autonomy shows, disquisitional statements will in the cease need to be tested against the work itself, not confronting factors outside it. To give Beardsley'south example, whether a statue symbolizes human destiny depends not on what its maker says only on our being able to make out that theme from the statue on the ground of our noesis of artistic conventions: if the statue shows a homo confined to a cage, nosotros may well conclude that the statue indeed symbolizes man destiny, for by convention the prototype of solitude fits that alleged theme. The anti-intentionalist principle hence follows: the interpreter should focus on what she can notice in the work itself—the internal show—rather than on external testify, such as the artist's biography, to reveal her intentions.

Anti-intentionalism is sometimes called conventionalism considering it sees convention equally necessary and sufficient in determining piece of work-meaning. On this view, the artist'south intention at best underdetermines meaning fifty-fifty when operating successfully. This can be seen from the famous argument offered by Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the artist'southward intention is successfully realized in the work, or it fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the work, appeal to external prove of the artist'south intention is non necessary (nosotros can detect the intention from the work); if it fails, such entreatment becomes insufficient (the intention turns out to be extraneous to the work). The determination is that an appeal to external evidence of the artist's intention is either unnecessary or bereft. As the second premise of the statement shows, the artist'due south intention is bereft in determining significant for the reason that convention alone can exercise the fob. Equally a result, the overall statement entails the irrelevance of external evidence of the artist's intention. To think of such evidence equally relevant commits the intentional fallacy.

At that place is a second manner to codify the intentional fallacy. Since the artist does not always successfully realize her intention, the inference is invalid from the premise that the artist intended her work to mean p to the conclusion that the work in question does mean p. Therefore, the term "intentional fallacy" has ii layers of pregnant: normatively, it refers to the questionable principle of interpretation that external evidence of intent should be appealed to; ontologically, information technology refers to the fallacious inference from probable intention to work-meaning.

b. Beardsley's Spoken communication Human activity Theory of Literature

Beardsley at a later point develops an ontology of literature in favor of anti-intentionalism (1981b, 1982). Reviving Plato'due south false theory of art, Beardsley claims that fictional works are essentially imitations of illocutionary acts. Briefly put, illocutionary acts are performed by utterances in particular contexts. For example, when a detective, convinced that someone is the killer, points his finger at that person and utters the judgement "yous did it," the detective is performing the illocutionary act of accusing someone. What illocutionary act is being performed is traditionally construed as jointly determined by the speaker'due south intention to perform that act, the words uttered, and the relevant atmospheric condition in that particular context. Other examples of illocutionary acts include asserting, warning, castigating, asking, and the like.

Literary works tin exist seen equally utterances; that is, texts used in a particular context to perform different illocutionary acts past authors. Nevertheless, Beardsley claims that in the example of fictional works in particular, the purported illocutionary strength will always be removed then as to brand the utterance an false of that illocutionary human activity. When an attempted act is insufficiently performed, it ends upwards being represented or imitated. For example, if I say "please pass me the salt" in my dining room when no one except me is there, I stop up representing (imitating) the illocutionary human activity of requesting considering there is no uptake from the intended audience. Since the illocutionary act in this example is only imitated, it qualifies as a fictional act. This is why Beardsley sees fiction every bit representation.

Consider the uptake condition in the case of fictional works. Such works are not addressed to the audience as a talk is: at that place is no concrete context in which the audience tin be readily identified. The uttered text hence loses its illocutionary force and ends upward existence a representation. Aside from this "address without access," another obtaining condition for a fictional illocutionary act is the existence of non-referring names and descriptions in a fictional work. If an author writes a poem in which she greets the great detective Sherlock Holmes, this greeting volition never obtain, because the proper noun Sherlock Holmes does non refer to whatsoever existing person in the world. The greeting will just terminate up being a representation or a fictional illocution. Past parity of reasoning, fictional works terminate upward beingness representations of illocutionary acts in that they always contain names or descriptions involving events that never have identify.

Now we must ask: by what criterion do we determine what illocutionary act is represented? Information technology cannot exist the speaker or author'south intention, considering even if a speaker intends to stand for a particular illocutionary act, she might terminate up representing another. Since the possibility of failed intention ever exists, intention would non be an appropriate benchmark. Convention is again invoked to determine the correct illocutionary human action existence represented. It is truthful that any practice of representing is intentional at the first in the sense that what is represented is adamant by the representer'due south intention. Nevertheless, once the connection betwixt a symbol and what it is used to represent is established, intention is said to exist discrete from that connection, and deciding the content of a representation becomes a sheer matter of convention.

Since a fictional piece of work is essentially a representation of an insufficiently performed illocutionary deed, determining what it represents does not require us to go across that incomplete performance, just every bit determining what a mime is imitating does non require the audition to consider annihilation outside her performance, such as her intention. What the mime is imitating is completely adamant past how we conventionally construe the human action being performed. In a similar fashion, when considering what illocutionary act is represented by a fictional piece of work, the interpreter should rely on internal evidence rather than on external evidence of authorial intent to construct the illocutionary human action beingness represented. If, based on internal data, a story reads like a castigation of war, information technology is suitably seen every bit a representation of that illocutionary deed. The conclusion is that the author's intention plays no role in fixing the content of a fictional work.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Beardsley'southward attitude toward nonfictional works is ambivalent. Obviously, his speech act argument applies to fictional works only, and he accepts that nonfictional works tin can be 18-carat illocutions. This category of works tends to have a more identifiable audience, who is hence not addressed without access. With illocutions, Beardsley continues to debate for an anti-intentionalist view of meaning according to which the utterer'due south intention does not determine pregnant. Simply his accepting nonfictional works as illocutions opens the door to considerations of external or contextual factors that go confronting his earlier stance, which is globally anti-intentionalist.

c. Notable Objections and Replies

One immediate concern with anti-intentionalism is whether convention lonely can point to a unmarried meaning (Hirsch, 1967). The common reason why people argue about interpretation is precisely that the work itself does not offer sufficient evidence to disambiguate meaning. Very oftentimes a work can sustain multiple meanings and the problem of pick prompts some people to appeal to the artist'south intention. It does not seem plausible to say that i tin can assign simply a unmarried pregnant to works like Ulysses or Picasso'due south abstract paintings if one concentrates solely on internal testify. To this objection, Beardsley (1970) insists that, in most cases, appeal to the coherence of the work can somewhen exit us with a single correct interpretation.

A second serious objection to anti-intentionalism is the instance of irony (Hirsch, 1976, pp. 24–v). Information technology seems reasonable to say that whether a work is ironic depends on if its creator intended it to be so. For instance, based on internal evidence, many people took Daniel Defoe's pamphlet The Shortest Way with the Dissenters to be genuinely against the Dissenters upon its publication. Yet, the just ground for saying that the pamphlet is ironic seems to be Defoe's intention. If irony is a crucial component of the piece of work, ignoring it would fail to respect the work'due south identity. Information technology follows that irony cannot exist grounded in internal evidence alone. Beardsley's reply (1982, pp. 203–7) is that irony must offer the possibility of understanding. If the artist cannot imagine anyone taking it ironically, there would be no reason to believe the work to be ironic.

However, the problem of irony is just part of a bigger concern that challenges the irrelevance of external factors to interpretation. Many factors present at the fourth dimension of the piece of work'south creation seem to play a central role in shaping a piece of work'south identity and content. Missing out on these factors would lead u.s.a. to misidentifying the work (and hence to misinterpreting information technology).

For example, a work will not be seen every bit revolutionary unless the interpreter knows something nigh the contemporaneous creative tradition: ignoring the work's innovation amounts to accepting that the work tin can lose its revolutionary character while remaining self-identical. If we come across this character every bit identity-relevant, we should then take it into consideration in our interpretation. The same line of thinking goes for other identity-conferring contextual factors, such as the social-historical weather and the relations the piece of work bears to contemporaneous or prior works. The present view is thus chosen ontological contextualism to foreground the ontological claim that the identity and content of a piece of work of art are in part determined by the relations information technology bears to its context of production.

Contextualism leads to an important stardom between piece of work and text in the case of literature. In a nutshell: a text is non context-dependent but a piece of work is. The anti-intentionalist stance thus leads the interpreter to consider texts rather than works because it rejects considerations of external or contextual factors. The aforementioned distinction goes for other fine art forms when nosotros depict a comparison betwixt an artistic production considered in its brute form and in its context of creation. For convenience, the word "piece of work" is used throughout with notes on whether contextualism is taken or not.

As a answer to the contextualist objection, it has been argued (Davies, 2005) that Beardsley'south position allows for contextualism. If this is convincing, the contextualist criticism of anti-intentionalism would non exist conclusive.

three. Value-Maximizing Theory

a. Overview

The value-maximizing theory tin can exist viewed as beingness derived from anti-intentionalism. Its core claim is that the principal aim of art interpretation is to offer interpretations that maximize the value of a work. There are at least two versions of the maximizing position distinguished by the commitment to contextualism. When the maximizing position is committed to contextualism, the constraint on interpretation volition be convention plus context (Davies, 2007); otherwise, the constraint will be convention only, as endorsed by anti-intentionalism (Goldman, 2013).

Equally indicated, the word "maximize" does non imply monism. That is, the present position does not claim that there can be simply a single mode to maximize the value of a work of fine art. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to presume that in most cases the interpreter tin can envisage several readings to bring out the value of the work. For example, Kafka's Metamorphosis has generated a number of rewarding interpretations, and it is difficult to argue for a unmarried best among them. As long equally an estimation is revealing or insightful under the relevant interpretative constraints, we may count it every bit value-maximizing. Such existence the case, the value-maximizing theory may exist relabelled the "value-enhancing" or "value-satisfying" theory.

Given this pluralist picture, the maximizer, unlike the anti-intentionalist, will need to accept the indeterminacy thesis that convention (and context, if she endorses contextualism) lonely does not guarantee the unambiguity of the piece of work. This allows the maximizing position to bypass the challenge posed by said thesis, rendering it a more flexible position than anti-intentionalism in regard to the number of legitimate interpretations.

Encapsulating the maximizing position in a few words: it holds that the chief aim of art interpretation is to enhance appreciative satisfaction by identifying interpretations that bring out the value of a piece of work within reasonable limits ready by convention (and context).

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The bodily intentionalist will maintain that figurative features such equally irony and innuendo must be analysed intentionalistically. The maximizer with contextualist commitment tin can counter this objection by dealing with intentions more sophisticatedly. If the relevant features are identity conferring, they will be respected and accepted in interpretation. In this example, any interpretation that ignores the intended feature ends upwardly misidentifying the work. But if the relevant features are not identity conferring, more room will be left for the interpreter to consider them. The intended characteristic can be ignored if it does non add to the value of the work. By dissimilarity, where such a characteristic is non intended just tin exist put in the work, the interpreter can all the same build it into the estimation if it is value enhancing.

The near important objection to the maximizing view has it that the nowadays position is in danger of turning a mediocre work into a masterpiece. Ed Wood's motion picture Plan ix from Outer Space is the most discussed example. Many people consider this work to be the worst picture ever made. Nevertheless, interpreted from a postmodern perspective every bit satire—which is presumably a value-enhancing interpretation—would plow it into a classic.

The maximizer with contextualist leanings tin reply that the postmodern reading fails to identify the film as authored by Forest (Davies, 2007, p, 187). Postmodern views were not available in Wood'due south time, so it was impossible for the film to be created as such. Identifying the film as postmodernist amounts to anachronism that disrespects the work's identity. The moral of this example is that the maximizer does not blindly enhance the value of a work. Rather, the piece of work to be interpreted needs to exist contextualized beginning to ensure that subsequent attributions of aesthetic value are done in calorie-free of the true and fair presentation of the piece of work.

4. Actual Intentionalism

Contra anti-intentionalism, actual intentionalism maintains that the artist's intention is relevant to interpretation. The position comes in at least iii forms, giving different weights to intention. The absolute version claims that work-meaning is fully determined by the artist's intention; the extreme version claims that the work ends upward being meaningless when the artist'south intention is incompatible with it; and the moderate version claims that either the artist's intention determines meaning or—if this fails—meaning is determined instead by convention (and context, if contextualism is endorsed).

a. Absolute Version

Accented actual intentionalism claims that a piece of work means whatsoever its creator intends it to hateful. Put otherwise, it sees the artist's intention equally the necessary and sufficient condition for a work'due south meaning. This position is often dubbed Humpty-Dumptyism with reference to the character Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass. This character tries to convince Alice that he tin brand a word mean what he chooses it to mean. This unsettling conclusion is supported by the statement about intentionless meaning: a mark (or a sequence of marks) cannot have pregnant unless it is produced by an agent capable of intentional activities; therefore, meaning is identical to intention.

It seems plausible to abandon the thought that marks on the sand are a poem once we know they were acquired past accident. But this at best proves that intention is the necessary condition for something'southward being meaningful; it does not testify further that what something means is what the agent intended it to mean. In other words, the statement virtually intentionless meaning does a better task in showing that intention is an indispensable ingredient for meaningfulness than in showing that intention infallibly determines the pregnant conveyed.

b. Extreme Version

To avert Humpty-Dumptyism, the farthermost actual intentionalist rejects the view that the artist'southward intention infallibly determines work-meaning and accepts the indeterminacy thesis that convention solitary does not guarantee a single axiomatic significant to be found in a work. The extreme intentionalist claims further that the meaning of the work is fixed by the artist's intention if her intention identifies one of the possible meanings sustained by the work; otherwise, the work ends upwardly existence meaningless (Hirsch, 1967). Amend put, the extreme intentionalist sees intention every bit the necessary rather than sufficient condition for piece of work-meaning.

Aside from the unsatisfactory result that a work becomes meaningless when the artist's intention fails, the nowadays position faces a dilemma when dealing with the instance of figurative linguistic communication (Nathan, in Iseminger (1992)). Take irony for example. The first horn of the dilemma is every bit follows: Constrained by linguistic conventions, the range of possible meanings has to include the negation of the literal meaning in order for the intended irony to be constructive. Merely this results in absolute intentionalism: every expression would be ironic equally long equally the author intends information technology to be. Just—this is the second horn—if the range of possible meanings does not include the negation of literal meaning, the expression simply becomes meaningless in that there is no appropriate meaning possible for the author to actualize. It seems that a broader notion of convention is needed to explicate figurative language. But if the extreme intentionalist makes that move, her intentionalist position will be undermined, for the writer's intention would be given a less important role than convention in such cases. However, this problem does non arise when the actual intentionalist is committed to contextualism, for in that case the contextual factors that make the intended irony possible will be taken into account.

c. Moderate Version

Though in that location are several unlike versions of moderate actual intentionalism, they share the common ground that when the artist'south intention fails, meaning is stock-still instead past convention and context. (Whether all moderate actual intentionalists take context into account is controversial and this commodity will not dig into this controversy for reasons of infinite.) That is, when the artist'southward intention is successful, information technology determines pregnant; otherwise, pregnant is determined by convention plus context (Carroll, 2001; Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005).

As seen, an intention is successful and so long as information technology identifies 1 of the possible meanings sustained by the work even if the meaning identified is less plausible than other candidates. Only what exactly is the interpreter doing when she identifies that meaning? Information technology is reasonable to say that the interpreter does non need to ascertain all the possible meanings and see if there is a fit. Rather, all she needs to exercise is to see whether the intended pregnant can be read in accord with the work. This is why the moderate intentionalist puts the success condition in terms of compatibility: an intention is successful so long as the intended significant is compatible with the work. The fact that a certain meaning is compatible with the work ways that the work tin sustain information technology as one of its possible meanings.

Unfortunately, the notion of compatibility seems to permit foreign cases in which an insignificant intention can determine work-significant every bit long as it is non explicitly rejected by the relevant interpretative constraint. For case, if Agatha Christie reveals that Hercule Poirot is actually a smart Martian in disguise, the moderate intentionalist would need to accept it because this proclamation of intention can still be said to be uniform with the text in the sense that it is non rejected by textual show. To avoid this bad event, compatibility needs to be qualified.

The moderate intentionalist and then analyses compatibility in terms of the meshing condition, which refers to a sufficient degree of coherence betwixt the content of the intention and the work's rhetorical patterns. An intention is compatible with the work in the sense that it meshes well with the work. The Martian case will hence be ruled out by the meshing condition because it does not engage sufficiently with the narrative even if information technology is not explicitly rejected by textual testify. The meshing condition is a minimal or weak success condition in that it does not require the intention to mesh with every textual feature. A sufficient amount will practise, though the moderate intentionalist admits that the line is not always easy to draw. With this weak standard for success, it can happen that the interpreter is non able to discern the intended meaning in the work before she learns of the artist's intention.

At that place is a second kind of success condition which adopts a stronger standard (Stecker, 2003; Davies, 2007, pp. 170–1). This standard for success states that an intention is successful simply in case the intended pregnant, among the possible meanings sustained by the work, is the i about likely to secure uptake from a well-backgrounded audience (with contextual knowledge and all). For example, if a work of art, inside the limits ready past convention and context, affords interpretations ten, y, and z, and x is more readily discerned than the other two by the appropriate audition, then 10 is the meaning of the work.

These accounts of the success status answer a notable objection to moderate intentionalism. This objection claims that moderate intentionalism faces an epistemic dilemma (Trivedi, 2001). Consider an epistemic question: how do we know whether an intention is successfully realized? Presumably, we figure out work-meaning and the creative person'due south intention respectively and independently of each other. And so we compare the ii to run into if there is a fit. Nevertheless, this motility is redundant: if nosotros can figure out work-pregnant independently of actual intention, why do nosotros need the latter? And if piece of work-meaning cannot be independently obtained, how tin nosotros know information technology is a case where intentions are successfully realized and not a instance where intentions failed? It follows that appeal to successful intention results in back-up or indeterminacy.

The beginning horn of the dilemma assumes that work-meaning can be obtained independently of noesis of successful intention, but this is imitation for moderate intentionalists, for they admit that in many cases the piece of work presents ambiguity that cannot be resolved solely in virtue of internal bear witness. The moderate intentionalist rejects the second horn past claiming that they exercise not determine the success of an intention past comparing independently obtained piece of work-meaning with the artist's intention (Stecker, 2010, pp. 154–v). As already discussed, moderate intentionalists suggest unlike success weather condition that do not appeal to the identity between the artist'due south intention and work-meaning. Moderate intentionalists adopting the weak standard hold that success is defined by the caste of meshing; those who prefer the stiff standard maintain that success is defined by the audience's ability to grasp the intention. Neither requires the interpreter to identify a work's meaning independently of the artist'due south intention.

d. Objections to Actual Intentionalism

The most usually raised objection is the epistemic worry, which asks: is intention knowable? It seems impossible for one to really know others' mental states, and the epistemic gap in this respect is thus unbridgeable. Bodily intentionalists tend to dismiss this worry as insignificant and maintain that in many contexts (daily chat or historical investigations) we have no difficulty in discerning another person's intention (Carroll, 2009, pp. 71–5). In that case, why would things suddenly stand up differently when it comes to art estimation? This is non to say that we succeed on every occasion of estimation, but that nosotros do so in an amazingly large number of cases. That being said, we should non decline the appeal to intention solely because of the occasional failure.

Some other objection is the publicity paradox (Nathan, 2006). The main idea is this: when someone South conveys something p by a production of an object O for public consumption, there is a second-order intention that the audience demand not become beyond O to achieve p; that is, at that place is no need to consult S'south first-club intentions to understand O. Therefore, when an creative person creates a piece of work for public consumption, there is a second-lodge intention that her first-order intentions not exist consulted, otherwise information technology would betoken the failure of the creative person. Actual intentionalism hence leads to the paradoxical claim that we should and should non consult the artist's intentions.

The bodily intentionalist'due south response (Stecker, 2010, pp. 153–4) is this: non all artists have the second-gild intention in question. If this premise is false, then the publicity argument becomes unsound. Even if it were true, the argument would still be invalid, because it confuses the intention that the artist intends to create something continuing alone with the intention that her commencement-order intention demand not exist consulted. The paradox will non hold if this stardom is made.

Lastly, many criticisms are directed at a popular argument among actual intentionalists: the conversation statement (Carroll, 2001; Jannotta, 2014). An illustration between conversation and fine art interpretation is drawn, and actual intentionalists claim that if nosotros accept that art interpretation is a course of conversation, we need to accept actual intentionalism as the right prescriptive account of estimation, because the standard goal of an interlocutor in a conversation is to grasp what the speaker intends to say. (This is a premise even anti-intentionalists accept, but they apparently refuse the farther merits that art estimation is conversational. Run across Beardsley, 1970, ch.1.) This illustration has been severely criticized (Dickie, 2006; Nathan, 2006; Huddleston, 2012). The greatest disanalogy betwixt chat and art is that the latter is more like a monologue delivered by the creative person rather than an interchange of ideas.

One way to meet the monologue objection is to specify more clearly the role of the conversational interest. In fact, the actual intentionalist claims that the conversational interest should constrain other interests such as the aesthetic interest. In other words, other interests can be reconciled or work with the conversational interest. Take the case of the hermeneutics of suspicion for instance. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a skeptical attitude—ofttimes heavily politicized—adopted toward the explicit opinion of a work. Interpretations based on the hermeneutics of suspicion accept to exist constrained by the creative person's not-ironic intention in lodge for them to count as legitimate interpretations. For instance, in attributing racist tendencies to Jules Verne's Mysterious Island, in which the black slave Neb is portrayed equally docile and superstitious, we need to suppose that the tendencies are not ironic; otherwise, the suspicious reading becomes inappropriate. In this instance, the creative chat does not end upwards being a monologue, for the suspicious hermeneut listens and understands Verne earlier responding with the suspicious reading, which is constrained by the conversational interest. A conversational interchange is hence completed.

v. Hypothetical Intentionalism

a. Overview

A compromise betwixt actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, the core merits of which is that the right meaning of a work is adamant past the best hypothesis nearly the creative person's intention fabricated past a selected audience. The aim of interpretation is then to hypothesize what the artist intended when creating the work from the perspective of the qualified audience (Tolhurst, 1979; Levinson, 1996).

Two points phone call for attention. Beginning, it is hypothesis—not truth—that matters. This means that a hypothesis of the actual intention will never exist trumped by knowledge of that very intention. Second, the membership of the audition is crucial because it determines the kind of evidence legitimate for the interpreter to use.

A 1979 proposal (Tolhurst) suggests that the relevant audition be singled out by the artist'south intention, that is, the audition intended to be addressed by the creative person. Piece of work-pregnant is thus adamant past the intended audience's all-time hypothesis virtually the creative person's intention. This ways that the interpreter will need to equip herself with the relevant beliefs and groundwork knowledge of the intended audience in guild to make the all-time hypothesis. Put some other style, hypothetical intentionalism focuses on the audience's uptake of an utterance addressed to them. This being so, what the audience relies on in comprehending the utterance will exist based on what she knows about the utterer on that particular occasion. Following this contextualist line of thinking, the meaning of Jonathan Swift'south A Modest Proposal will non be the suggestion that the poor in Ireland might ease their economic pressure by selling their children as food to the rich; rather, given the groundwork knowledge of Swift's intended audience, the best hypothesis most the author's intention is that he intended the work to be a satire that criticizes the heartless attitude toward the poor and Irish gaelic policy in general.

However, at that place is a serious problem with the notion of an intended audience. If the intended audition is an extremely pocket-sized group possessing esoteric knowledge of the artist, pregnant becomes a private matter, for the work can only be properly understood in terms of private information shared between creative person and audience, and this results in something close to Humpty-Dumptyism, which is characteristic of absolute intentionalism.

To cope with this trouble, the hypothetical intentionalist replaces the concept of an intended audience with that of an platonic or appropriate audience. Such an audience is not necessarily targeted by the artist'due south intention and is platonic in the sense that its members are familiar with the public facts about the artist and her piece of work. In other words, the platonic audience seeks to anchor the work in its context of cosmos based on public evidence. This avoids the danger of interpreting the work on the footing of private bear witness.

The hypothetical intentionalist is enlightened that in some cases there will be competing interpretations which are equally skillful. An aesthetic criterion is then introduced to adjudicate between these hypotheses. The aesthetic consideration comes every bit a tie billow: when we attain 2 or more epistemically all-time hypotheses, the one that makes the work artistically meliorate should win.

Some other notable distinction introduced by hypothetical intentionalism is that betwixt semantic and categorial intention (Levinson, 1996, pp. 188–9). The kind of intention nosotros have been discussing is semantic: it is the intention by which an creative person conveys her message in the work. By contrast, categorial intention is the creative person'due south intention to categorize her production, either every bit a work of art, a certain artform (such as Romantic literature), or a detail genre (such every bit lyric poetry). Categorial intention indirectly affects a piece of work's semantic content considering it determines how the interpreter conceptualizes the work at the fundamental level. For instance, if a text is taken as a grocery list rather than an experimental story, we will translate it as saying cypher beyond the named grocery items. For this reason, the artist'south categorial intention should be treated as among the contextual factors relevant to her piece of work'southward identity. This motility is frequently adopted by theorists endorsing contextualism, such equally maximizers or moderate intentionalists.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

Hypothetical intentionalism has received many criticisms and challenges that merit mention. A often expressed worry is that it seems odd to stick to a hypothesis when newly found evidence proves it to exist simulated (Carroll, 2001, pp. 208–9). If an artist'southward private diary is located and reveals that our best hypothesis nearly her intention regarding her piece of work is imitation, why should we cling to that hypothesis if the newly revealed intention meshes well with the work? Hypothetical intentionalism implausibly implies that warranted assertibility constitutes truth.

The hypothetical intentionalist clarifies her position (Levinson, 2006, p. 308) by proverb that warranted assertibility does not constitute the truth for the utterer's meaning, but it does found the truth for utterance pregnant. The platonic audience's best hypothesis constitutes utterance significant even if it is designed to infer the utterer's meaning.

Another troublesome objection states that hypothetical intentionalism collapses into the value-maximizing theory, for, when making the all-time hypothesis of what the artist intended, the interpreter inevitably attributes to the artist the intention to produce a piece with the highest degree of artful value that the work can sustain (Davies, 2007, pp. 183–84). That is, the epistemic criterion for determining the best hypothesis is inseparable from the aesthetic criterion.

In answer, it is claimed that this objection may stem from the impression that an creative person normally aims for the best; however, this does not imply that she would anticipate and intend the artistically best reading of the piece of work. It follows that it is not necessary that the best reading be what the artist most likely intended even if she could have intended it. The objector replies that, still, the state of affairs in which we have 2 epistemically plausible readings while one is junior cannot arise, because we would prefer the junior reading only when the superior reading is falsified by evidence.

The tertiary objection is that the distinction between public and private evidence is blurry (Carroll, 2001, p. 212). Is public testify published evidence? Does published information from private sources count equally public? The reply from the hypothetical intentionalist emphasizes that this is not a distinction between published and unpublished data (Levinson, 2006, p. 310). The relevant public context should be reconstrued as what the artist appears to have wanted the audience to know about the circumstances of the work's creation. This means that if information technology appears that the artist did non want to make certain proclamations of intent known to the audience, then this show, even if published at a later point, does non constitute the public context to be considered for interpretation.

Finally, 2 notable counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism have been proposed (Stecker, 2010, pp. 159–lx). The showtime counterexample is that W means p but p is non intended by the artist and the audition is justified in believing that p is not intended. In this instance hypothetical intentionalism falsely implies that West does not mean p. For example, information technology is famously known among readers of Sherlock Holmes adventures that Dr. Watson's war wound appears in 2 different locations. On one occasion the wound is said to be on his arm, while on another it is on his thigh. In other words the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson's wound. But given the realistic style of the Holmes adventures, the best hypothesis of authorial intent in this case would deny that the impossibility is part of the significant of the story, which is apparently simulated.

Notwithstanding, the hypothetical intentionalist would not maintain that W ways p, because p is non the best hypothesis. She would not claim that the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson'south wound, for the best hypothesis made by the ideal reader would be that Watson has the wound somewhere on his trunk—his arm or thigh, just exactly where we do non know. It is a error to presuppose that W means p without following the strictures imposed by hypothetical intentionalism to properly reach p.

The second counterexample to hypothetical intentionalism is the case where the audition is justified in assertive that p is intended by the artist but in fact West means q; the audience would and then falsely conclude that Due west ways p. Again, what W means is determined by the ideal audience's all-time hypothesis based on convention and context, not by what the work literally asserts. The pregnant of the work is the product of a prudent assessment of the full show bachelor.

half dozen. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist

a. Overview

There is a 2d diversity of hypothetical intentionalism that is based on the concept of a hypothetical creative person. Generally speaking, information technology maintains that interpretation is grounded on the intention suitably attributed by the interpreter to a hypothetical or imagined creative person. This version of hypothetical intentionalism is sometimes called fictionalist intentionalism or postulated authorism. The theoretical appliance of a hypothetical creative person can be traced dorsum to Wayne Booth's business relationship of the "unsaid author," in which he suggests that the critic should focus on the author we can make out from the work instead of on the historical author, because there is ofttimes a gap between the two.

Though proponents of the present brand of intentionalism disagree on the number of acceptable interpretations and on what kind of prove is legitimate, they concord that the interpreter ought to concentrate on the appearance of the work. If it appears, based on internal evidence (and perhaps contextual information if contextualism is endorsed), that the creative person intends the piece of work to mean p, so p is the right interpretation of the piece of work. The artist in question is not the historical artist; rather, it is an creative person postulated by the audition to be responsible for the intention made out from, or implied past, the piece of work. For example, if in that location is an anti-war attitude detected in the work, the intention to castigate state of war should be attributed to the postulated artist, not to the historical artist. The motivation behind this move is to maintain work-centered interpretation but avert the fallacious reasoning that any we observe in the work is intended by the existent artist.

Inheriting the spirit of hypothetical intentionalism, fictionalist intentionalism aims to make estimation work-based only writer-related at the same time. The biggest departure between the 2 stances is that, equally said, fictionalist intentionalism does not appeal to the actual or real creative person, thereby avoiding whatsoever criticisms arising from hypothesizing about the real artist such equally that the best hypothesis about the real artist's intention should exist abandoned when compelling evidence against information technology is obtained.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The commencement business organisation with fictionalist intentionalism is that constructing a historical variant of the actual artist sounds suspiciously similar hypothesizing about her (Stecker, 1987). But in that location is still a difference. "Hypothesizing well-nigh the actual artist," or more accurately, "hypothesizing the actual artist'due south intention," would be a characterization of hypothetical intentionalism rather than fictionalist intentionalism. The latter does not track the actual creative person'due south intention only constructs a virtual one. As shown, fictionalist intentionalism, unlike hypothetical intentionalism, is allowed to whatsoever criticisms resulting from ignoring the actual artist'southward declaration of her intention.

A second objection criticizes fictionalist intentionalism for non being able to distinguish betwixt different histories of artistic processes for the same textual appearance (Livingston, 2005, pp. 165–69). For example, suppose a piece of work that appears to be produced with a well-conceived scheme did result from that kind of scheme; suppose further that a second work that appears the same really emerged from an uncontrolled process. So, if we follow the strictures of fictionalist intentionalism, the interpretations we produce for these two works would turn out to exist the aforementioned, for based on the same advent the hypothetical artists nosotros construct in both cases would exist identical. Merely these two works accept different artistic histories and the difference in question seems too crucial to be ignored.

The objection hither fails to consider the subtlety of reality-dependent appearances (Walton, 2008, ch. 12). For example, suppose the showroom note beside a painting tells united states of america it was created when the painter got heavily drunk. Whatever well-organized characteristic in the work that appears to result from careful manipulation by the painter might at present either expect matted or structured in an eerie way depending on the feature'due south actual presentation. Compare this scenario to another where a (almost) visually indistinguishable counterpart is exhibited in the museum with the exhibit annotation revealing that the painter spent a long period crafting the work. In this second example the audience'southward perception of the work is not very likely to be the same as that in the first case. This shows how the apparent creative person account tin can still discriminate between (appearances of) different creative histories of the same artistic presentation.

Finally, in that location is often the qualm that fictionalist intentionalism ends upwardly postulating phantom entities (hypothetical creators) and phantom actions (their intendings). The fictional intentionalist can respond that she is giving descriptions but of appearances instead of quantifying over hypothetical artists or their actions.

vii. Conclusion

From the above discussion we tin discover ii major trends in the debate. Start, near late 20th century and 21st century participants are committed to the contextualist ontology of art. The relevance of art's historical context, since its starting time philosophical appearance in Arthur Danto's 1964 essay "The Artworld," continues to influence analytic theories of fine art estimation. At that place is no sign of this trend diminishing. In Noël Carroll's 2016 survey article on interpretation, the contextualist basis is all the same assumed.

Second, actual intentionalism remains the nigh popular position among all. Many substantial monographs have been written in this century to defend the position (Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Carroll, 2009; Stock 2017). This intentionalist prevalence probably results from the influence of H. P. Grice'southward work on the philosophy of language. And over again, this trend, similar the contextualist vogue, is still ongoing. And if we come across intentionalism as an umbrella term that encompasses not only actual intentionalism merely also hypothetical intentionalism and probably fictionalist intentionalism, the influence of intentionalism and its related accent on the concept of an artist or author will be even stronger. This presents an interesting dissimilarity with the tendency in mail service-structuralism that tends to downplay authorial presence in theories of interpretation, equally embodied in the author-is-dead thesis championed by Barthes and Foucoult (Lamarque, 2009, pp. 104–15).

8. References and Further Reading

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1970). The possibility of criticism. Detroit, MI: Wayne Land University Press.

  • Contains four philosophical essays on literary criticism. The offset 2 are amid Beardsley's most important contributions to the philsoophy of interpretation.

  • Beardsley, Thou. C. (1981a). Aesthetics: Bug in the philosophy of criticism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

  • A comprehensive volume on philosophical problems across the arts and also a powerful statement of anti-intentionalism.

  • Beardsley, Chiliad. C. (1981b). Fiction as representation. Synthese, 46, 291–313.

  • Presents the speech act theory of literature.

  • Beardsley, G. C. (1982). The aesthetic point of view: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Contains the essay "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," in which Beardsley applies his speech act theory to the interpretation of fictional works.

  • Booth, W. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (iind ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains the original business relationship of the implied author.

  • Carroll, N. (2001). Across aesthetics: Philosophical essays. New York, NY: Cambridge Academy Press.

  • Contains in particular Carroll's conversation argument, word on the hermenutics of suspicion, defense force of moderate intentionalism, and criticism of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Carroll, N. (2009). On criticism. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • An engaging book on creative evaluation and interpretation.

  • Carroll, N., & Gibson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Routledge companion to philosophy of literature. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • Anthologizes Carroll's survey commodity on the intention contend.

  • Currie, G. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Academy Press.

  • Contains a defense of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Currie, G. (1991). Work and text. Mind, 100, 325–40.

  • Presents how a commitment to contextualism leads to an important distinction betwixt work and text in the example of literature.

  • Danto, A. C. (1964). The artworld. Journal of Philosophy, 61, 571–84.

  • First paper to draw attention to the relevance of a work's context of production.

  • Davies, S. (2005). Beardsley and the autonomy of the work of fine art. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63, 179–83.

  • Argues that Beardsley is actually a contextualist.

  • Davies, S. (2007). Philosophical perspectives on art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Role II contains Davies' defence of the maximizing position and criticisms of other positions.

  • Dickie, G. (2006). Intentions: Conversations and fine art. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46, 71–81.

  • Criticizes Carroll's conversation argument and actual intentionalism.

  • Goldman, A. H. (2013). Philosophy and the novel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains a defense of the value-maximizing theory without a contextualist commitment.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1967). Validity in interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale Academy Press.

  • The about representative presentation of farthermost intentionalism.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1976). The aims of interpretation. Chicago, IL: Academy of Chicago Press.

  • Contains a collection of essays expanding Hirsh's views on estimation.

  • Huddleston, A. (2012). The conversation statement for bodily intentionalism. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 52, 241–56.

  • A brilliant criticism of Carroll'south conversation argument.

  • Iseminger, Grand. (Ed.). (1992). Intention & interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Academy Press.

  • A valuable collection of essays featuring Beardsley's account of the work's autonomy, Knapp and Michaels' absolute intentionalism, Iseminger's extreme intentionalism, Nathan'southward account of the postulated artist, Levinson'south hypothetical intentionalism, and 8 other contributions.

  • Jannotta, A. (2014). Interpretation and conversation: A response to Huddleston. British Journal of Aesthetics, 54, 371–80.

  • A defense of the conversation argument.

  • Krausz, M. (Ed.). (2002). Is there a single right interpretation? Academy Park: Pennsylvania State University Printing.

  • Another valuable anthology on the intention argue, containing in particular Carroll'southward defense of moderate intentionalism, Lamarque'south criticism of viewing work-meaning as utterance meaning.

  • Lamarque, P. (2009). The philosophy of literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

  • The third and the fourth chapters discuss analytic theories of interpretation forth with a critical assessment of the author-is-expressionless claim.

  • Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasure of aesthetics: Philosophical essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Printing.

  • The tenth chapter is Levinson's revised presentation of hypothetical intentionalism and the distinction betwixt semantic and categorial intention.

  • Levinson, J. (2006). Contemplating art: Essays in aesthetics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson's replies to major objections to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Levinson, J. (2016). Aesthetic pursuits: Essays in philosophy of art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson's updated defense of hypothetical intentionalism and criticism of Livingston's moderate intentionalism.

  • Livingston, P. (2005). Fine art and intention: A philosophical study. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Printing.

  • A thorough discussion on intention, literary ontology, and the problem of estimation, with emphases on defending the meshing condition and on the criticisms of the ii versions of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Nathan, D. O. (1982). Irony and the artist's intentions. Journal of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism, 22, 245–56.

  • Criticizes the notion of an intended audience.

  • Nathan, D. O. (2006). Art, meaning, and creative person's significant. In M. Kieran (Ed.), Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art (pp. 282–93). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • Presents an business relationship of fictionalist intentionalism, a critique of the conversation statement, and a cursory recapitulation of the publicity paradox.

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). The postulated author: Disquisitional monism equally a regulative ideal. Critical Research, 8, 133–49.

  • Presents another version of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R. (1987). 'Credible, Implied, and Postulated Authors', Philosophy and Literature 11, pp 258-71.

  • Criticizes different versions of fictionalist intentionalism

  • Stecker, R. (2003). Interpretation and construction: Art, spoken communication, and the police. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • A valuable monograph devoted to the intention debate and its related problems such as the ontology of art, incompatible interpretations and the application of theories of art estimation to law. The book defends moderate intentionalism in detail.

  • Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of fine art: An introduction. Lanham, Doc: Rowman & Littlefield.

  • Contains a chapter that presents the disjunctive conception of moderate intentionalism and the two counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R., & Davies, Southward. (2010). The hypothetical intentionalist's dilemma: A answer to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics, 50, 307–12.

  • Counterreplies to Levinson's replies to criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stock, Thou. (2017). But imagine: Fiction, interpretation, and imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains a defense of absolute (the author uses the term "extreme") intentionalism.

  • Tolhurst, W. E. (1979). On what a text is and how it means. British Journal of Aesthetics, nineteen, 3–14.

  • The founding document of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Trivedi, S. (2001). An epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 41, pp. 192–206.

  • Presents an epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism and defense force of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Walton, K. L. (2008). Marvelous images: On values and the arts. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Press.

  • A collection of essays, including "Categories of Fine art," which might accept inspired Levinson's conception of categorial intention; and "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," which is a defense of fictionalist intentionalism in terms of the notion "apparent artist."

  • Wimsatt, W. Grand., & Beardsley, M. C. (1946). The intentional fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54, 468–88.

  • The first thorough presentation of anti-intentionalism, commonly regarded equally starting bespeak of the intention argue.

Author Information

Szu-Yen Lin
E-mail: lsy17@ulive.pccu.edu.tw
Chinese Culture University
Taiwan